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Backed by rapid economic growth, growing financial 
clout, and a newfound sense of assertiveness in recent 
years, the BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China—are a driving force behind an incipient 
transformation of the world economy away from a US-
dominated system toward a multipolar one in which 
developing countries will have a major say. It is, however,  
in the international monetary arena that the notion 
of multipolarity—more than two dominant poles—
commands renewed attention and vigorous debate. For 
much of its history, the quintessential structural feature of 
the international monetary system has been unipolarity—
as American hegemony of initiatives and power as well as 
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its capacity to promote a market-based, liberal order came 
to define and shape international monetary relations. As 
other currencies become potential substitutes for the US 
dollar in international reserves and in cross-border claims, 
exchange rate volatility may become more severe. There 
are also risks that the rivalry among the three economic 
blocs may spill over into something more if not kept in 
check by a strong global governance structure. While the 
transition will be difficult and drawn out, governments 
should take immediate steps to prevent financial volatility 
by enhancing cooperation on monetary policies, currency 
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The New Multi-polar International Monetary System 
 
 
For the first time in modern history, leading emerging nations have a real chance to shape the evolution of the 
international monetary system. Key actors in this scenario are the BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China—whose growing presence on the global stage has been the defining feature of the world economic 
landscape of the early 21
st century. Backed by rapid economic growth, growing financial clout, and a newfound 
sense of assertiveness in recent years, the BRICs are a driving force behind an incipient transformation of the 
international monetary system away from a US-dominated system toward one that is more regionally based and 
in which developing countries have a major say. Meanwhile, increasing economic cohesion in Europe--- 
particularly within the 16 member states of the euro area--- is a separate source of pressure on the international 
monetary system to adjust. Both the BRICs and the euro area will contribute to the evolution of the international 
monetary system, as they work to strengthen their relative position and mold the system to their purpose, 
reinforcing the underlying shifts in the global economic relations and how they will come to be 
managed. The global governance structure defined for much of the post-war era by the dominant 
position of the United States, its liberalism, and its support for multilateralism, is now undergoing some 
important changes, as the underlying power distribution is shifting toward multi-polarity. What 
implications this shift may have for the evolution of the international monetary system and its 
management are issues of paramount importance to academics, policymakers and market practitioners. 
Addressing these questions is the main objective of this paper. 
Multi-polarity, of course, has different implications when applied to different spheres of contemporary 
international relations
2. In politics, where much of the discussion has been focused, the debate centers on non-
polarity, in which numerous concentrations of power exist with no single center dominating—a viewpoint 
forcefully argued by Richard Haass
3. In the realm of trade, multilateralism reigns, notwithstanding the failure of 
the current Doha Round of the World Trade Organization. In fact, multilateralism in trade has been the greatest 
achievement of the post-war international negotiations that launched the Bretton Woods consensus of “embedded 
liberalism”—a compromise solution favoring trade expansion at the expense of a liberal financial order. Greatly 
influenced by the experience of the Great Depression and World War II, the architects of the Bretton Woods 
system supported the use of capital controls by governments as a tool for preserving control over national 
macroeconomic policy, and as a means of defending stable exchange rates and liberal international trade. By 
contrast multilateralism has been absent in the treatment of international investment flows, where bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) have constituted the dominant international vehicle for the promotion and 
governance of FDI transactions. Since the 1960s, the number of BITs has grown rapidly, reaching more 
than 2,500 by 2007, and encompassing 176 countries across the globe.  
Yet, it is in the international monetary arena that the notion of multi-polarity—more than two dominant 
poles—commands renewed attention and vigorous debate. Some, such as Barry Eichengreen, argue that there is 
                                                 
2 For an analytical definition of multipolarity, see Edward D. Mansfield, “Concentration, Polarity, and the Distribution of 
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no substitute for the US dollar at the top of the international monetary system
4. This position, however, ignores 
the recent dramatic shifts in relative economic power and the deep interdependencies between the United States 
and other major players. Broadly speaking, important decisions regarding the international monetary system 
must now account for the interests of Europe and fast-growing emerging markets (the BRICs for certain, but for 
some purposes also such countries as Korea, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia).  
Nonetheless, the three poles—the United States, the euro area, and the BRICs—share a common interest 
in maintaining financial stability and facilitating trade and economic growth. Trade and investment flows 
between the three entities account for a large part of their respective global flows. About one-quarter of US 
exports go to the euro area and one-quarter to BRIC countries, while 16 percent of the total exports of BRICs go 
to the United States and 29 percent go to the euro area. Dense cross-border foreign direct investment transactions 
have created strong mutual interests and interdependencies. American multinationals hold more than one-third of 
their total direct overseas investments in companies located in the euro area, and European banks have 
established a strong presence in BRICs through extensive networks of subsidiaries and branches. Combined, the 
three poles account for 61 percent of world output, 51 percent of world trade, and 63 percent of world stock 
market capitalization.  
Going forward, the international monetary system is likely to become a more managed system. In this 
regard, the BRICs have proposed a greater role for the International Monetary Fund’s quasi-currency, the Special 
Drawing Rights (SDR), in providing a multilateral substitute for the dollar. In support of this stance, China, 
Brazil, and Russia have signaled their intention to purchase a combined $70 billion of forthcoming IMF bonds, 
which are to be priced in SDRs. In principle, cooperation such as this could reduce the risk of crises as well as 
accommodate the wishes of the rising powers. But there are risks that the rivalry among the three economic 
blocs may spill over into something more if not kept in check by a strong global governance structure. For 
instance, if the global economy faces a severe energy price or supply shock, a trade war, or a financial crisis, 
uncoordinated responses may be inadequate or perverse.  
 
Challenging the Global Order  
Meeting for the first time as a fraternity of rising powers in the Russian town of Yekaterinburg on June 
16, 2009, leaders of the BRIC countries reiterated, this time collectively, their demand for a new multi-polar 
world order. Longstanding dissatisfaction with how the world is managing its international monetary affairs is an 
important factor underlying the BRICs’ challenge to the international monetary system created in the aftermath 
of World War II, even though they have been among the main beneficiaries of the system. For much of its 
history, the quintessential structural feature of that system has been uni-polarity—as American hegemony of 
initiatives and power as well as capacity to project a liberal order came to define and shape international 
monetary conduct and structure. While the system has been generally credited for the early post-war successes in 
securing currency convertibility of the Western European currencies and launching a multilateral trading system, 
there remains much controversy about its structural bias against developing countries, assigning them a 
peripheral role in the process of making and remaking the international financial architecture. It is, thus, of 
                                                                                                                                                                         
3 Richard N. Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow US Dominance” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008.    
4 
 
interest to remember that the first loan extended by the World Bank in its early days of existence was not to a 
developing country, but to France in May of 1947 ($250 million reconstruction credit), followed by similar 
reconstruction loans to the Netherlands, Denmark, and Luxembourg. It was not until March 1948 that the first 
loan to a developing country was approved---to Chile for $16 million in support of financing a hydroelectric 
plant and production of agricultural machinery. It was indeed after the US had taken over the task of 
reconstruction of Western Europe through the Marshal Plan that the architects of the Bretton Woods system 
turned their attention to matters of development and financing the developing world.  
Though the international role of the dollar has evolved over time, US monetary policy has set the tone 
for global monetary conditions for most of the post-war era, while US balance of payments deficits have served 
as the engine of global liquidity expansion, determined endogenously in a complex interaction with the operation 
of offshore Eurodollar markets. Between 1944, the year the Bretton Woods system was established, and 2008, 
the United States has run a deficit on its current account of the balance of payments for 36 years and for every 
year since 1992. This has led to amassing liabilities to the rest of the world totaling $7.37 trillion (according to 
some estimates), with about 50 percent accumulated over 2003–07 alone--- years when the world economy 
experienced an economic growth boom fueled by high credit expansion and liquidity. But until the mid-1960s, 
the US current account remained broadly in balance, as the combination of a healthy trade surplus and income 
on US overseas investments provided the necessary resource space to pay for the three key levers of US 
international monetary power: overseas military expenditure, foreign aid, and private investment abroad (see 
Figure 1). However, this balance between resource availability and commitments to foreign economic relations 
began to unravel in the mid-1970s as the trade account turned negative and continued to grow in a big way, 
reaching $840 billion in 2006. It has been only the financial crisis of 2008 and its fallout of deep economic 














                                                                                                                                                                         
4 Barry Eichengreen, “The Dollar Dilemma” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2009. 
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Even more important for global economic outcomes than the US current account position is the stance of 
US monetary policy, which is understandably tailored to US economic realities. Thus, monetary policy changes 
in the United States, even if appropriate from a domestic US standpoint, can cause economic distress elsewhere. 
The sharp increase of US interest rates in the early 1980s, for example, helped precipitate the emerging market 
debt crisis of the 1980s—whose primary cause was the excessive borrowing of recycled petrodollars. Tightening 
of US monetary policy in 1994 no doubt contributed to the problems facing the Mexican economy, which in turn 
led to the collapse of the peso at the end of that year. Monetary easing in the United States has also had 
important consequences on the rest of the world, contributing to booms in commodity prices in the early 1970s 
and again in the lead-up to the current crisis. Figure 2 below highlights the relationship between movements in 
the United States federal funds target rate and changes in global industrial production. 
 
Figure 2: US monetary policy geared towards domestic objectives, but with global implications 
 
While a multi-polar monetary system is not necessarily a bad thing in itself—there is no reason for a 
monopoly of power in international finance, and as Barry Eichengreen argues
8, competition may lead to better 
policies—it has intrinsic dangers that require a strengthening of global institutions. But the nascent institutions 
                                                                                                                                                                         
7 U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, Jul 1, 1945-Sep 30, 2007, U.S. Agency for 
International Development. 
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that have emerged from the current crisis with enhanced powers, in particular the G20 and the Financial Stability 
Board (formerly the Financial Stability Forum) are not adequate in their current state to serve as permanent fora 
for cooperation in international finance. Bodies with global membership, and hence greater legitimacy, are 
needed to institutionalize the recognition that international cooperation is essential to mitigate further crises. 
Without enhanced cooperation, the fundamental causes of the current crisis—inadequate coordination of 
macroeconomic policies leading to global imbalances and a “race to the bottom” in prudential regulation, as well 
as laissez-faire monetary policies—will not be addressed. 
 
Economic Power Realignment 
 
 s dramatic as the 2008 financial crisis has been in shaking public confidence in US stewardship of global 
finance, the BRICs’ challenge of the established global order has been in the making for many years. Four 
striking shifts in global economic relations over the past decade contributed materially to this evolution. First, a 
major realignment of economic power has occurred, as emerging market countries and oil exporters have 
accumulated vast claims on the United States (and, to a lesser extent, on other “rich” countries). Second, the 
euro, launched on January 1, 1999, has become an important player in the international monetary system—more 
in some areas than others, but to an extent that means that there is now a viable alternative to the dollar. Third, 
there has been a general decline of multilateralism in a number of areas. Fourth, strong economic growth, 
improved economic policies, and increasingly mature institutions have led to an expanded international role for 
the emerging market economies. All of these developments, meanwhile, have played a role in the dilution of US 
power and the emergence of regional poles and ad hoc groupings such as the BRICs. Taken as a whole, these 
shifts will mean that important decisions regarding global economic reform in the years ahead can no longer be 
made solely by the United States and its allies, or even within the G7.  
It is widely accepted that global imbalances associated with a low rate of saving in the United States and 
a high saving rate in Asia, combined with upward pressure on natural resource prices, have led to a massive 
accumulation of foreign assets by emerging market and oil exporting countries. China now holds about $2.3 
trillion in official foreign exchange reserves, almost 50 percent of which has been accumulated since 2004 as the 
country runs a large current account surplus, both with the United States and globally. Assets under management 
by sovereign wealth funds are estimated to be in the order of $3.9 trillion as of the end of 2008, nearly two-thirds 
of which are funded by earnings from commodity exports, mostly oil and gas. As of end 2008, the foreign 
financial assets of all petrodollar investors are estimated by McKinsey Global Institute to be $5 trillion, despite 
some losses incurred as the result of the financial crisis.  
The significance of the launch of the euro, on the other hand, is often underestimated. For the first time, 
a multilateral currency was created as the outcome of voluntary, international negotiations rather than as a 
projection of hegemonic power. Indeed, it is what John Maynard Keynes envisioned at Bretton Woods but which 
never emerged at the global level. The SDR, by contrast, is defined in terms of a basket of existing currencies 
(US dollar, British pound, euro, and Japanese yen) and has never functioned as a full-fledged currency. In its ten 
years of existence, the euro has indeed emerged as a legitimate rival to the dollar. In some years, global 
international debt issuance in euros has surpassed that in greenbacks. Absorption of an ever-expanding set of 
currencies into the euro area has created a regional economy with a large pool of capital and has dramatically 
A    
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lowered transaction costs and currency volatility for investors in member countries, while the euro serves as 
anchor or reference point for a large swath of neighboring countries. The fraction of global foreign exchange 
reserves denominated in dollars (of those reserves whose currency has been publicly identified), at slightly less 
than two-thirds, has declined steadily over the past decade. Though commodities—in particular oil—are still 
priced in dollars, the dollar’s supremacy in this area is also being questioned. 
With a weakening of US economic power there has also been a weakening of multilateralism in favor of 
strengthening regional integration and asserting regional interests. There are several causes for this. One is that 
the process of European integration has become a model for other regions. Mercosur, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, and several groups of African and East Asian countries are planning, or at least discussing, the creation 
of regional currencies and pooling of financial resources. Another cause is the growing doubt about the capacity 
of global financial institutions—principally the IMF— to respond to large-scale global financial crises. The 
Asian response in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis was to self-insure—i.e., to accumulate vast foreign exchange 
reserves in order to weather future crises without having to resort to IMF lending and contingent policy advice. 
In addition, East Asian countries have pursued regional monetary cooperation, in particular through the Chiang 
Mai Initiative. 
As the shift in global foreign asset holdings has diminished the strength of the United States and the G7 
in the international monetary system, emerging market economies, exemplified by the BRICs, have gained 
maturity and respectability. China has been tremendously successful in gradually transitioning from a centrally 
planned to a mixed economic system without a serious economic crisis, along the way becoming the world’s 
second-largest economy and the third-largest exporter. India – which, after decades of sluggish economic 
growth, finally opened up to the outside world – is now growing quickly and beginning to become a global 
power. Brazil, after taming hyperinflation through a dollar peg, successfully moved to a floating exchange rate 
and “made at home” monetary policy based on inflation targeting while simultaneously curbing endemic fiscal 
deficits. Brazil, like Russia, also benefited from the sustained rise in commodity prices that accompanied the 
global boom.  
As a consequence of this and other reforms, emerging markets have become an investment-grade asset 
class. At the same time, the financial crisis has severely tarnished the reputation of the United States and other 
developed-country financial markets, since they were at the origin of the crisis. The crisis has uncovered the gaps 
in financial regulation in those countries and called into question the supposed sophistication of their financial 
institutions. Moreover, the aftershocks of the crisis are likely to continue for some time, since many developed 
countries have incurred large debts (which will need to be paid down through increased taxation and spending 
cuts) and taken ownership of banks and nonfinancial companies whose management and eventual re-
privatization will absorb not only fiscal but also political resources. 
In sum, rather than a world in which decisions on the international monetary system are made primarily 
by the United States, as has been the case during much of the post-war period, the next few decades are likely to 
see at least three major power centers —the United States, the euro area (or EU more widely), and the BRICs 
(along with other large emerging markets and oil exporters with sufficient influence and power to assert their 
interests). Regional integration is likely to develop further. The BRICs are not regionally based and are a loose 
grouping, but individually they participate in different regional integration initiatives. Regional integration is    
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likely to continue to be strongest in Europe. East Asia, where manufacturing is already very integrated across 
borders, is poised for a decision on regional monetary integration. Meanwhile, monetary integration around the 
US dollar in the Western Hemisphere is unlikely to make much progress.  
  
Power Centers with Very Different Strategies 
 
ivergences in past and prospective power and in regional cohesion mean that the emerging power centers 
will likely have very different strategies for addressing global problems and with regards to international 
monetary reform. In turn, these differences will probably lead to difficulty in agreeing upon and implementing 
major reforms, even when such reforms are generally recognized as desirable. In particular, reform of 
governance at the international financial institutions, creation of an international reserve asset, and initiatives to 
strengthen financial regulation will pit the various blocs against each other. 
The fact that the United States faces a decline in its relative economic power means that it will have to 
brace for greater policy interdependency and market linkages in shaping its domestic and foreign economic 
policy. In the immediate post-war years, the United States had the luxury of embracing multilateralism and the 
reduction of trade barriers because of its position as the world’s strongest economy, at the same time making it 
beneficial for other countries to follow its lead by providing generous financial assistance. The United States is 
no longer in that fortunate position. In order to mitigate an abrupt loss of power, the United States is likely to be 
selective in its support for multilateral institutions, and will concentrate instead on the bilateral relationships in 
which it can best project and maintain its economic power. This may take the form of bilateral trade deals or 
currency swap arrangements with other central banks—as the Federal Reserve has done with Brazil, Mexico, 
South Korea and a number of other countries over the course of the crisis. While supportive in principle of the 
BRICs’ desire to expand their voting power at the IMF, which would come at the expense of Europe, the United 
States will resist any reform that would jeopardize its own veto power within the institution. Similarly, it will 
seek to retain its close relationship with Middle East oil producers and to play a key role in global energy 
markets.  
The BRICs, despite their diversity in political structure and economic development, are likely to support 
reforms that help to maintain the real value of their newly acquired wealth, while at the same time remaining 
critical of existing institutions and a division of power that is a holdover from World War II and the Cold War. 
Thus, they are likely to come together on the need to move away from the US dollar as the linchpin of the 
international monetary system, provided some guarantees are given for the value of their dollar assets. With 
official holdings of $1.95 trillion in dollar denominated assets, and total merchandise trade of $1.9 trillion, they 
have a strong interest in ensuring that the transition to multi-polarity is not at the cost of high financial market 
volatility or disruption in the flows of world trade, investment and capital. As articulated by Zhou Xiaochuan, 
Governor of the People’s Bank of China, the fundamental issue “ is to create an international reserve currency 
that is disconnected from individual nations and is able to remain stable in the long run, thus removing the 
inherent deficiencies caused by using credit- based national currencies” (March 23, 2009, www.pbc.gov.cn). Part 
of the solution has been to enhance the role of the SDR through increasing its supply, promoting its use in 
international trade and debt issuance, and expanding its use beyond the current official circle, by making 
available SDR-denominated bonds to qualified private investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies 
D    
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that would be attracted due to portfolio diversification as well as the natural currency hedging embodied in the 
structure of the SDR. 
 In this context, the Chinese proposals to increase SDR issuance and promote its market appeal are clear 
areas of common interest to the BRICs. But in other areas the BRICs have very different objectives, and more 
rivals than partners. Whether measured by geography, political structure, or level of economic development, the 
BRICs are a deeply diverse set of countries. A tour of the four capitals of the BRICs, for example, requires 
traveling 22,000 miles, almost five times the distance between Washington and Brussels. Likewise, GDP per 
capita in the BRICs covers a broad range, from approximately $12,000 in Russia to $1,000 in India, with Brazil 
at $8,400 and China at $2,700. Both China and Russia, for example, have geopolitical ambitions, while Brazil 
and India are less concerned with projecting global political power than consolidating their economic 
achievements and rebalancing global institutions toward developing countries. Meanwhile all four countries will 
face tough competition in the global corporate M&A market, as they provide support to their blue chip 
companies to help them expand abroad and globalize.  
In many ways, Europe will continue to be inwardly focused in the coming years, as the European Union 
(EU) continues to enlarge and address the fault lines exposed by the financial crisis. While the transition of the 
former satellites of the Soviet Union from planned to market economies and the expansion of the EU to include 
many of these countries has been an extraordinary achievement, the work is not yet finished. The heterogeneity 
of views on the future of Europe, as well as the unwieldiness of governing by agreement among more than two 
dozen countries, makes it essential to hammer out a new constitution that can be sold to the public of all member 
countries. Additionally, the European Central Bank needs to be supported by a strengthening of other EU 
institutions, the democratic deficit needs to be addressed, and the EU bureaucracy streamlined. In the financial 
arena, the lack of Europe-wide regulation and a common supervisor has led to problems—fumbled responses to 
failing banks and inadequate knowledge of cross-border exposures. As for dealing with the BRICs, the EU is in a 
position of weakness given its energy dependence, in particular on oil from the Middle East and gas from Russia, 
giving these countries the potential to exploit their market power and strategic position.  




Figure 3: Trade Flows between Blocs 
 
 
Dangers of a Multi-polar World 
 
xcept for occasional joint interventions by ad hoc groupings of major powers, the current international 
monetary system is largely uncoordinated, presciently described some three decades ago by Max Corden as 
a “nonsystem
9.” Instead, countries generally attempt to keep their own monetary policy houses in order (with 
varying degrees of success) by targeting inflation, while letting their exchange rates fluctuate. The main 
exception among major economies, of course, is China. Despite Chinese authorities’ formal move toward greater 
exchange rate flexibility in July 2005, the renminbi has experienced limited appreciation against the US dollar in 
the face of Chinese current and capital account surpluses that remain large, reflecting the importance of 
                                                 
9 Max Corden, “The Logic of the International Monetary Non-System” in Fritz Machlup, Gerhard Fels, and Hubertus 
Müller-Groeling, eds., Reflections on the Troubled World Economy: Essays in Honour of Herbert Giersch (London: 
Macmillan, 1983), pp. 59-74 
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underlying structural saving-investment imbalances. There is no anchor, however, to the system as a whole, and 
global liquidity is the result of the actions of individual central banks, multiplied by the operation of offshore -
currency markets.  
 Though the international monetary “nonsystem” continues to revolve around the dollar, the currency of 
the world’s largest economy with the most liquid financial markets, the rise of the euro and other currencies have 
made measuring global liquidity in terms of only dollar liquidity inadequate. Still, whether considered in terms 
of the dollar alone or in terms of multiple currencies, there is nothing that ensures that the amount of liquidity is 
appropriate for the global economy.  
Advocates of floating exchange rates, such as Milton Friedman, traditionally have maintained that 
exchange rate flexibility combined with sound domestic macroeconomic policies would insulate countries from 
inappropriate policies abroad
10. The experience of floating exchange rates since 1973, however, has belied that 
line of thinking. Exchange rates do not always adjust in an appropriate direction. Monetary independence is not 
absolute, even with a freely floating exchange rate. And US interest rates do have transmission effects to other 
countries, even those with flexible exchange rates. Thus, claims by economists such as Andrew Rose that 
floating exchange rates and inflation targeting preclude the need for policy coordination
11 do not ring true. Asset 
price bubbles and crashes, along with their contagion effects across countries, cause excess volatility in foreign 
exchange and other asset markets that are best addressed by joint policy action. That said, policy coordination 
may be more difficult in a multi-polar system when compared to a hegemonic one.  
Moreover, an unmanaged international monetary system will not prevent one of the blocs from using 
exchange rate undervaluation to stimulate economic growth, or overvaluation to achieve “competitive 
disinflation” in response to a global supply shock. In addition to China, even the United Kingdom and 
Switzerland have been criticized for their acceptance of currency depreciation in response to the severe 
economic downturn currently afflicting them. When exchange rates are deliberately manipulated, or fortuitously 
do not adjust, there is the danger that global imbalances will develop, as has occurred over the past decade. 
Present mechanisms for macroeconomic policy surveillance, primarily the responsibility of the IMF, are 
inadequate, in particular policies influencing the exchange rate. Countries not beholden to IMF borrowing— 
which in practice means all developed and major emerging market countries—blithely ignore the IMF’s advice. 
Another problem with the current international monetary nonsystem is exchange rate volatility, which 
will be exacerbated by the usage of multiple major reserve currencies. As Robert Triffin argued five decades ago 
with respect to the US dollar, reserve currencies are subject to crises of confidence when they run balance of 
payments deficits
12. While such deficits may be essential to augment global liquidity, the associated increase in 
claims on the anchor country can raise doubts about its ability to honor them. In a world with a single reserve 
currency, the possibilities of substituting away from that currency are limited. Thus, despite concerns about US 
monetary policy and large US current account deficits in recent decades, the dollar has not faced a disorderly 
fall—the dreaded “hard landing.” In a multiple-reserve-currency setting, however, credibility problems can have 
                                                 
10 Milton Friedman, “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates” in Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 157-203. 
11 Andrew K. Rose, “A Stable International Monetary System Emerges: Inflation Targeting is Bretton Woods, Reversed” 
NBER Working Paper No. 12711, November 2006.    
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an immediate impact as holders of one major currency easily shift to another, exposing the disfavored currency 
to quick, sharp depreciation and the favored currency to rapid appreciation. In this regard, the BRICs’ calls for a 
shift away from the dollar could trigger a crisis of confidence in the currency, causing massive losses in the value 
of dollar-denominated assets. Without coordination of the transition away from a dollar-dominated system to a 
multi-polar or true multilateral monetary system, there are dangers of financial instability with consequences for 
economic activity and development in all countries. 
 
Need for Better Governance  
 
he international monetary system faces a major challenge in accommodating the reality of multiple power 
centers. Already, the importance of the BRICs has been acknowledged in the creation of the G20, the 
current hub for international discussion about policy measures to address the current financial crisis, and in the 
Financial Stability Board, a grouping of financial officials with similar membership. However, the G20, like the 
G7, faces a problem of legitimacy .While it is more representative of the realities of global power than the G7, it 
excludes many middle-size and smaller countries, and thus does not satisfy the universality principle of 
multilateralism entrenched in the post-war economic order. Neither the G20 nor the Financial Stability 
Board is a global institution, and neither has a secretariat that is thus able to lay the groundwork for important 
decisions by the member governments and guarantee follow-through. Such a role would normally be assumed by 
multilateral financial institutions, in particular the IMF and the World Bank. Alternatively, multilateral 
organizations with more restricted membership—e.g., the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development and the Bank for International Settlements—could be expanded to take on a global role, or new 
institutions created to do so. However it is achieved, it is imperative that the institutions of global financial 
governance be strengthened in advance of the occurrence of further major global shocks. 
Ultimately, the instabilities associated with the coexistence of major reserve currencies must lead to 
either dominance of one of them or agreement to create a more managed international monetary order. The 
current monetary nonsystem embodies serious  risks, however. Without international cooperation, the prospects 
for early resolution of the rivalry among currencies seem extremely remote. The euro may rival the dollar, but it 
is unlikely to take over its preeminent role. Among the BRICs, there is no candidate for the title at present. While 
the renminbi might become an important international currency at some time in the future, China first needs to 
further develop its financial infrastructure and make progress with other economic reforms. Thus, there is 
renewed interest in managing the international monetary system, such as the Chinese proposal to revive the SDR 
as a reserve currency, and in moving away from the nonsystem. But the SDR in its current form—a basket of 
currencies—does nothing to solve the problem of multiple reserve currencies. Rather, it simply allows some 
hedging of exchange-rate risk. Even with increased use of the SDR, global liquidity would still be the result of 
uncoordinated actions of major central banks. International regulation of liquidity would require the creation of 
the equivalent of a global central bank. Creation of such an institution would not only require agreement on how 
to manage decision-making powers, but its effectiveness and legitimacy would have to be supported by other 
global institutions. Thus, the advent of a global central bank is in the distant future, if at all. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
12 Robert Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960). 
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What progress can be made in the meantime in order to reduce instability? In the short run, the risks of 
dollar devaluation on the major reserve holders can be mitigated by providing some guarantee relative to the 
SDR, either by the United States or through a multilateral institution. A substitution account—an idea that dates 
back to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system—could be created to enable the orderly switch by reserve 
holders from the dollar to the SDR or the euro. At the same time, major central banks should swallow their 
reservations and agree to more active and coordinated intervention in foreign exchange markets. While the 
effectiveness of unilateral interventions is doubtful, a demonstrated willingness to counter disorderly movements 
through appropriate actions by both the appreciating and depreciating country would prevent the large swings 
that might otherwise occur. Thus, the major reserve currency nations need to cooperate much more closely, and 
expand the scope of their monetary policy objectives beyond domestic inflation to include global financial 
stability. 
The deficiencies of nationally-based financial regulation have also been recently highlighted by financial 
globalization. However, the reality of jealously-guarded sovereignty in this area and the desire of the major 
financial centers to maintain their competitive advantage guarantee that a global financial regulator will not 
emerge from the current crisis. The more limited goal should be to enhance cooperation and information sharing 
across borders and to move to greater harmonization of regulation, while keeping supervision at the national 
level where it can be most effective.  
 
Summing Up  
 
The history of the international monetary system suggests that there is a large degree of inertia in 
currency use. Thus, moving away from the dominance of the US dollar could be expected to be a gradual 
process. Creation of the euro and the growing economic clout of the BRICs over the past decade, however, have 
led to a new environment in which a multi-polar international monetary system is beginning to emerge. For the 
first time in 65 years, there are genuine international alternatives to the dollar. A multi-polar monetary 
environment, however, is likely to exacerbate currency instability, leading to shifts into and out of the major 
reserve currencies, which in turn is likely to lead to increasing demands for a managed international monetary 
system and a move away from the “nonsystem” that emerged after the breakdown of Bretton Woods in the 
1970s. The substantial economic power that the euro area and the BRICs are now able to exert will make it 
impossible for the United States to successfully resist a reshaping of the international monetary system toward a 
more multilateral and managed one. While the transition will be difficult and drawn out, governments should 
take steps to prevent financial volatility by enhancing cooperation on monetary policies, currency market 
intervention and financial regulation. The new Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth adopted 
by the G 20 leaders in Pittsburgh in September 2009, embodying a process of mutual assessment of each other’s 
policies, provides a promising approach to international cooperation and policy coordination.   
 
 